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The Courtesy Games: Efficiency, Inequality, and the Demand for Regulation

  • Co-Author:Prof. Timo Heinrich (Hamburg University of Technology), Prof. Stefan Traub, and Christine Meemann (both Helmut Schmidt University / Bundeswehr University)
  • Keywords: Experiment, Courtesy Game, Efficiency, Inequality, Regulation

Project Details

We introduce and experimentally test the predictions of a simple congestion game capturing the trade-off many commuters face: They must waste time in the queue of a traffic jam or they will run late for work when starting later to avoid traffic or need to start very early. In our experiment, we allow for asymmetric payoffs and vary the inequality associated with more efficient outcomes in order to identify boundary conditions for successful coordination. We then complement this experimental analysis with a large-scale vignette study that elicits representative preferences for equality and efficiency across relevant travel scenarios derived from the experimental data.